SWOT Analysis
Presidential Preference Survey
Period Ending April 5, 2010
VILLAR: Surging Ahead
Now ahead by 9 percentage points and the top spender in TV advertising, Sen. MANUEL VILLAR of the NACIONALISTA PARTY has began surging forward for the finish line 35 days into May 10, 2010 election day. His advantages include:
=A stream of nine (9) gubernatorial defections from the ruling LAKAS party
=Alliances with 110 congressional candidates nationwide, including 45 from the administration party
=Strong cooperation initiatives with two major progressive, left-leaning groups
| |
Favored to win 3.1 in 10 Filipinos, according to Tools & Strategy PLC |
He has successfully cultivated growing ascendancies in the three main sectors of the Philippine political economy. Poverty alleviation remains the central theme of his voter acquisition initiative. Campaign messages target the emotions of men and women across a wide cross-section of most families in the Philippines—the jobless, under-employed, homeless, low-income, less educated. The propagation of his populist agenda is working well.
VILLAR'S General Acceptability Rating has gone up to 83%—including 33% in presidential preference and 50% in governance capability. In previous Philippine election experience there has never been a loss for any candidate who has achieved a GAR above 80%.
Sixty years old, VILLAR by far is the most prepared presidential aspirant—logistically and functionally. His central staff oversees well-coordinated, efficient, well-financed teams that touched base with NGOs, communities, corporations, and influential families across 51 million voters nationwide. Men and women on the ground use person-to-person (P2P), person-to-companies (P2C), person-to-groups (P2G), and person-to-organizations (P2O) to present his platform and solicit support (Refer to Part 1).
Although under strain from allegations he was not the poor guy his TV ads impressed upon the public mind, he has gained a formidable ascendancy—challenged and hard-pressed on top of positive gains in the last three months from a TV and radio mileage that runs with a prime-time exposure of more than 96 minutes per day on major networks. As intensive TV advertising and word-of-mouth campaigns raise public awareness on the senator's ascendancy and platform, the top-of-mind shares of VILLAR has begun to pay off into vote conversions.
VILLAR continues to get positive reviews among the country's overseas foreign workers (note: same as overseas contract workers) for whom he had promised the formation of a bank that would provide them soft loans for processing job contracts abroad.
His wife, Rep. CYNTHIA VILLAR, has been instrumental in building a strong nationwide organization, from the time he ran for a Senate seat till he made up mind for the presidency juggernaut last year. The NP is in top form and running to crank up between 8% and 15% of the national vote, in addition to the 20% his parallel framework is preparing to deliver. Altogether his candidacy is expected to rake in 31% of the national vote.
| STRENGTHS ANALYSIS1 | |
| Specific Aspect | REMARKS |
| Financial | $89 million (P4 billion) in campaign funds on hand |
| Organization | Run by company managers; regional point men in key cities |
|
| 110 congressional allies in 32 provinces |
|
| Buttressed by nine (9) gubernatorial defectors |
|
| Undergoing consolidations in 41 vote-rich provinces |
| Mobility | Large nationwide car pool; 2 airplanes; 5 helicopters |
| Communications | Mobile and landline-based |
| Support facilities | Operational bases in company projects on the main islands |
| Reputation | Positioning as a rags-to-riches story |
| Strategy | Intensive TV advertising; coalition building |
| Messaging | Poverty alleviation targeting services and agriculture sectors |
|
| Who dares dreams wins |
| Personality | Friendly, composed, confident-looking |
| WEAKNESSES ANALYSIS | |
| Specific Aspect | REMARKS |
| Organization | Loose; restless; under strain and stress |
|
| Loyalists insecure from treatment given to defectors |
|
| Teams ran like a business enterprise |
| Staff | Confused from infusion of new allies |
| Structure | Decision making too centralized; responsibility lines vague |
| Reputation | At risk from negative publicity and mudslinging by adversaries |
| Support facilities | Provincial HQs not established |
|
| Inadequate precinct-level vote conversion |
| Reputation | At risk from propaganda, privileged criticism, allegation |
| Strategy | TV-based message penetration inadequate |
| Messaging | Populist appeal may backfire on massive advertising expense |
|
| Created the notion he will flood election day with money |
| OPPORTUNITIES ANALYSIS | |
| Specific Aspect | REMARKS |
| Strategy | Penetrating Filipino voter psyche penetration through platform |
| Platform | Illustrating the socio-economic benefits of his presidency |
| Organization | Establishing district-level coordinators for vote conversion |
|
| Alliances with defectors from the ruling party LAKAS |
| Staff | Deploying more volunteers to speed up consolidation |
| Structure | Constituting ideal setup for better, quicker response |
| Media Relations | Increasing mind share through more press releases |
|
| Pitching more issues to newspaper columnists |
| Corporate | Presenting socio-economic scenarios to companies |
| Specific actions | Rapid consolidation in vote-rich services sector |
|
| Raising ascendancy in the industrial sector |
|
| Quick consolidation in agriculture sector |
| THREATS ANALYSIS | |
| Specific Aspect | REMARKS |
| Negative Issues | Conflict of interest: C5 controversy |
|
| Communists in his senatorial ticket |
|
| Illegal land conversions for his real estate company |
|
| Influence peddling for Crown Property loans |
|
| Discreet GMA backing for his presidential bid |
|
| Touted as greedy, cold-blooded capitalist |
|
| Abandoned by voters if no money materializes on election day |
|
| Defectors only after of money |
|
| Possible compromises to recover election expenses |
AQUINO: Weaknesses Unraveled
Finally bouncing back from a long slide, Sen. BENIGNO AQUINO III has chalked up 25 percentage points to regain second place and is reconsolidating for the homestretch. But, as long as the administration party contender GILBERT TEODORO JR remains within a striking distance, he is by no means secure in his General Acceptability Rating of 75%. Although governance capability-rated at 50% and the preferred presidential candidate by one out of four voters in this national tracking poll, his ascendancy swings in two extremes—high and large among older, mature voters but low and small among the younger ones.
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A lot of catching up to do in 40 days, Tools & Strategy PLC says, referring to his strengths among older, mature voters and weaknesses among the younger ones. |
His slide by 11 percentage points between December 2009 and March 27, 2010 had been largely attributed to widespread perception by the public about his lack of management experience and leadership capability, on the one hand, and dependence on the legacy of his parents (former president CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO and father BENIGNO AQUINO, on the other.
Critics portrayed him as a man who cannot rise on his own merits and who will end up dependent on the advice of other people. His TV ads showed him to be either "insubstantial" or "dull." Hounded by allegations that he had formed his own private security agency at the height of mother's presidency and benefited largely from the patronage of government corporations, his anti-corruption theme instead struck a discordant note among the country's mature voters. He is being asked to explain why HACIENDA LUISITA sugarcane estate of his family was spared from land reform that was a cornerstone program of her mother's presidency between 1986 and 1992.
Despite the slide in his acceptability ratings, he remained popular though in the National Capital Region and townships around Metro Manila where voters are known to support candidates perceived to be the "genuine opposition." This recent survey shows the contest over who better deserves the public trust as the "true opposition" between VILLAR, AQUINO and ESTRADA toward whipping grass-root support for their respective senatorial and congressional candidates.
Mobilized only late in October 2009, the AQUINO campaign has been hamstrung by a weak organization and inadequate funds. It has gained little from the defections that struck the ruling party LAKAS toward the end of March 2010 and is getting less lift from cash-strapped allies in 81 provinces of the country where the Liberal Party fielded "token" candidates. The outpouring of respect and sense of loss (that was felt nationwide during the funeral procession for his mother emerged) has soon died out; it cannot sustain the emotional hype upon which his presidential draft was set.
In a nation where patronage politics runs deep across ethnic lines, the good-versus-evil messaging AQUINO had used against opponents, notably Sen. VILLAR and former defense secretary GILBERT TEODORO, has apparently produced a strong adverse reaction. Voters in the industrial sector had expected him to avoid mudslinging and present a decent, high-level, platform-oriented campaign. For most of them he sounded "vindictive" and crying out for revenge for the scorn President Arroyo has had shown against his mother.
Because most of the provincial and mayoralty candidates of the Liberal Party are over 65 years old, they had been unable to shore up his ascendancy among young and middle-aged voters. While he scored high in transparency, integrity, and accessibility parameters (see Table 1), he did not have adequate staff support to explain his platform across a wide range of voter segments nationwide. By capitalizing on regular TV and radio news conferences he has been able to effectively convey messages with great success. But, unless he is able to refine his messaging and put up a veritable provincial-level organization, another slip in his current General Acceptability Rating of 75% toward the homestretch will be irreversible.
Poorly organized, lacking in leadership, and short in cash, the Liberal Party is expected to crank up between 5% and 9% only in turnout to shore up his chances, especially this time when the administration party has begun flexing its muscle and re-grouping around TEODORO, who remains within striking distance from his second-to-third-place position as shown in recent national tracking pools.
| STRENGTHS ANALYSIS | |
| Specific Aspect | REMARKS |
| Financial | $41 million (P1.85 billion in campaign fund pledges) |
| Organization | Composed of old politicians (old allies of his mother) |
|
| Alliances with left-leaning groups |
|
| Linkage with militant labor unions |
| Allies | Traditional lines of the Liberal Party and old LDP |
| Mobility | Service car pool nationwide; 1 charter airplane; 3 helicopters |
| Communications | Mobile and landline-based; |
| Reputation | Positioning as corruption buster |
| Strategy | Intensive TV advertising |
| Messaging | Continuity in the democracy legacy of his parents |
| Personality | Weak, dull, wimpy looking |
| WEAKNESSES ANALYSIS | |
| Specific Aspect | REMARKS |
| Organization | Weak, loose, family-ran |
|
| Business fear return of active unionism in factories |
| Staff | Provincial staff untrained in coalition building, organizing |
| Structure | Tight rein on decision making; responsibility lines vague |
| Financial | Campaign fund shortages |
| Reputation | At risk from negative publicity and mudslinging by adversaries |
|
| Future government policy will be pro-labor/pro-union |
|
| Appointment of leftists to government positions |
| Support facilities | Regional coordinators dependent on local candidates |
|
| Unclear arrangements with provincial LP allies |
| Reputation | At risk from propaganda, privileged criticism, allegation |
| Strategy | Reliance on TV advertising |
| Messaging | Popularity may backfire on lack of qualification, experience |
|
| Shows left-of-center scenario that's inimical to business |
|
| Made promises that people believe he can't keep |
|
| Gave commitments that his mother failed to honor |
|
| Paints specter of communist resurgence in countryside |
| OPPORTUNITIES ANALYSIS | |
| Specific Aspect | REMARKS |
| Strategy | Vote conversion based on AQUINO legacy and past alliances |
|
| Tapping left-leaning groups and NGOs for vote conversion |
|
| Propagate populist agenda in services/agriculture sectors |
|
| Solidify initiatives in the industrial sector |
| Platform | Letting voters understand benefits of his presidency |
| Organization | Empowering provincial and district-level coordinators |
|
| Exploit access to captains of industry |
| Staff | Recruiting and sending more volunteers to countryside |
|
| Touching bases with former Cory cabinet officials |
| Structure | Decentralizing campaign strategy adjustments |
| Media Relations | Maintaining public mention through more press releases |
|
| Increasing opinion pitches to newspaper columnists |
| Corporate | Presenting a new socio-economic scenarios to CEOs |
| Specific actions | Rapid consolidation in vote-rich services sector |
|
| Raising ascendancy in the industrial sector |
|
| Quick consolidation in agriculture sector |
| THREATS ANALYSIS | |
| Specific Aspect | REMARKS |
| Personal Issues | Gray areas in platform of government |
|
| Inadequate in meeting high public expectation |
|
| Failing to rise on his own merit and using Cory legacy |
|
| Lacking in performance track record as lawmaker |
|
| Dependence on his financial patrons |
|
| Idealist lacking in direction |
|
| Inexperience and lack of leadership capability |
|
| Incompetent and short of qualification |
|
| Haven't connected with the masses |
| Negative Issues |
|
|
| Land reform resistance and Hacienda LUISITA |
|
| MENDIOLA MASSACRE |
ESTRADA: Spoiler stays on
Former president JOSEPH ESTRADA gained 19 percentage points to date with a spectacular rebound from a poor start in February and now smarting from increased TV advertising exposure and out-of-town sorties.
From 6% at the start of the campaign period for the presidency, he has risen to 13% after the February 21–25 celebration of the People Power Revolution and capped his comeback with good results in Mindanao.
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As election day nears, ESTRADA finds himself losing grasp of the finances and organization he needed for yet another forceful comeback to the Philippine presidency |
| STRENGTHS ANALYSIS | |
| Specific Aspect | REMARKS |
| Financial | $15 million (P700 million) in pledges from contributors |
| Organization | Comprises old politicians seeking re-elections |
| Allies | Friends and supporters from remnants of LAMMP and NPC |
| Mobility | Limited car pool nationwide |
| Extra help | Village leaders disenchanted by GMA administration |
| Communications | Mobile and landline-based |
| Reputation | Positioned as alternative to VILLAR and AQUINO |
|
| Better than young and inexperienced AQUINO |
|
| Better than money-greedy, opportunist VILLAR |
| Strategy | TV advertising; organizing former countryside allies |
| Messaging | Peace and development for balanced national growth |
| Personality | Friendly, old but charismatic; can handle crowds |
| WEAKNESSES ANALYSIS | |
| Specific Aspect | REMARKS |
| Organization | Loose, rag-tag collective of recycled politicians |
| Financial | Inadequacy in campaign funds |
| Staff | Lacked staff trained in coalition building, organizing |
| Structure | JEE personally in charge |
| Reputation | Risk-prone to negative publicity and brickbats |
| Support facilities | Only a handful of campaign coordinators |
| Strategy | Too dependent TV and media relations |
| Messaging | Defensive: Tied to extricating himself from criminal plunder conviction |
| OPPORTUNITIES ANALYSIS | |
| Specific Aspect | REMARKS |
| Reputation | Experienced as short-lived president and long-time VP |
| Strategy | Vote conversion in the 52–75 years old bracket |
| Platform | Balanced national growth; peace and order |
| Organization | Empowerment for provincial and district-level coordinators |
| Staff | Recruitment, training and fielding more volunteers |
| Structure | Management of decentralized campaign strategy adjustments |
| Media Relations | Increasing media mileage through more press releases |
|
| Increasing opinion pitches to newspaper columnists |
| Corporate | Left-of-center scenarios to win confidence of industrialists |
| Specific actions | Rapid consolidation in vote-rich services sector |
|
| Raising ascendancy in the industrial sector |
|
| Quick consolidation in agriculture sector |
| THREATS ANALYSIS | |
| Specific Aspect | REMARKS |
| Personal Issues | Conviction from plunder |
|
| Political deadwood |
|
| Philanderer |
|
| Breakdown in provincial support |
| Financial | Unrealized campaign fund pledges |
| Negative Issues | Involvement in JUETENG and other illegal gambling forms |
|
| Friendship with political warlords and private armies |
|
| Misuse of funds funneled into his scholarship foundation |
TEODORO: Precarious position
He was supposedly happy sharing second-place billing alongside his Liberal Party counterpart and improving his General Acceptability Rating of 76%—that's 1% higher than AQUINO'S. But utter dependence on political machinery only left ruling party presidential standard bearer GILBERT TEODORO JR frustrated. He felt that Manila pollsters conspired to bring him down in the ratings game from which he posted improving yet single-digit scores in the last three months. Before March ended, he stepped down from party chairmanship but reaffirmed his determination to win.
Against three contenders vying for a simple majority, victory isn't farfetched. All he needs his 27% of the total votes nationwide and the party has already 18% in store for it.
But maintaining control in his dual role as party top gun and candidate must have been very difficult for him. Campaign funds, which President Gloria Arroyo still controlled, came down in trickles. Party leaders themselves were engaged in their own reelection campaigns. Provincial allies ganged up on him for financial aid toward mobilizing resources.
With Mrs. Arroyo attending to her husband's hospitalization, no one in LAKAS KAMPI cracked the whip anymore against erring members who gravitated to the opposition in large numbers. Defections are inevitable in any loose alliance, but for the former defense secretary it was made worse by a president who had called the shots for her own congressional bid and had abandoned him.
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Will he be able to hold the ruling party together and lead it to victory? |
Hounded by public perception as a "surrogate" of President Arroyo and portrayed as a "political opportunist" by former colleagues in the National People's Coalition (under which he ran for three terms as congressman, TEODORO has risen from a less-comfortable position to become the "dark horse." Without new and effective TV ads that could have put him in the consciousness of voters again and sooner than soon, analysts say his quick recovery was in doubt.
His campaign took off from single-digit ratings in December 2009 and January 2010, on a relatively late start following his consolidation as standard bearer of the LAKAS KAMPI party. Backstopped by colleagues in the Department of Defense in which he served as secretary, he relies on a large network of volunteers running P2O, P2G, and P2C in colleges and universities that by far put him well-entrenched in the psyche of voters across the 18-28 and 29-39 age brackets, on the one hand, and in the industrial sector of the Philippine economy.
As the predominantly Roman Catholic nation went into the Lent holidays, it was already certain for TEODORO that the party has been weakened by kinks in leadership and organizational structures. Advisers feared that the party may lose the capability to undertake an effective campaign and to promote his candidacy. He was to beat the clock in rousing the public's passion for him and sustain that passion and interest at a financial cost only Mrs. Arroyo can fully provide. His decision to step down from the chair triggered a wake of resignations from other party bigwigs and more defections to the opposition NACIONALISTA PARTY.
By far his biggest consolation was the singular fact that his initiatives in university and college professors and students had paid huge electoral premiums. A general acceptability rating of 76% shored up by young men and women must have been encouraging. This huge improvement must have stemmed from massive person-to-person (P2P) and person-to-group (P2G) campaigns done by more 300 volunteer-student groups in colleges and universities across the country.
University and college professors turned out to be "positive influencers" that are comparable to "command votes" in conventional campaign management psychology. The results reflect this huge, fresh, who-dares-wins initiative.
Hundreds of other volunteer groups among professionals doing group-to-group (G2G) discussions with peers have contributed much to shoring up his candidacy.
What shortfalls he was unable to fill through conventional TV ads, he did compensate on the ground with people, Campaigns & Image Group says in its analysis. Inner party wrangling and defections continue unabated, though. Arroyo still holds the purse strings.
Whether he will be able to recover quickly remains a subject of speculation. The opposition has spread word around that he was preparing to throw in the towel. Now the party stands in equal footing with the opposition—working out solutions to ensure that his supporters troop to the polling stations and cast their ballots in his favor.
More importantly, there are tactical advantages that can be tapped from legions of undecided voters that needed swaying by massive logistical preparations in the closing weeks of the campaign.
| STRENGTHS ANALYSIS | |
| Specific Aspect | REMARKS |
| Financial | $64 million (P2.89 billion) in pledges |
| Organization | 70% of politicians seeking re-elections |
|
| Coordinators present in 78 provinces |
|
| Receiving advice/guidance from CIA |
|
| "Command votes" tapped in RP 500 companies |
| Allies | Friends and supporters in both LAKAS KAMPI and NPC |
|
| Student organizations in colleges/universities nationwide |
|
| First-name friendship with captains of industry |
|
| Captive audiences in government offices |
|
| Word-of-mouth support from 115,000-member military |
|
| Endorsement from 114,000-member PNP |
|
| Countryside support of 125,000 CVO/paramilitary troops |
| Mobility | Service car pool nationwide; 3 charter airplanes; 6 helicopters |
| Extra help | Department of Defense/PNP: 20 generals, 50 senior colonels |
| Communications | Mobile and landline-based; AFP COMMEL + NDCC network |
| Reputation | Positioning as Mr. Clean |
| Strategy | Youth and campus sector organizing; less on TV ads |
| Messaging | Continuity of balanced growth in the country's economy |
| Personality | Friendly, ambivalent, dynamic |
| WEAKNESSES ANALYSIS | |
| Specific Aspect | REMARKS |
| Organization | Loose, regionally empowered make-up |
|
| Congressional and gubernatorial defections |
|
| Inefficient, inexperienced party leadership |
|
| Disunity between LAKAS, KAMPI and CMD |
|
| Women-volunteers organizing out-of-town sorties |
| Financial | Lack of campaign funds |
| Staff | Lacked staff trained in coalition building, organizing |
| Structure | Responsibility lines not well-defined |
| Reputation | Risk-prone to negative publicity and brickbats |
| Support facilities | Campaign coordinators reliant on local candidates |
| Strategy | Too dependent on party-based initiatives |
| Messaging | Difficulty in distancing himself from GMA shadow |
|
| Inadequate, weak advertising |
| OPPORTUNITIES ANALYSIS | |
| Specific Aspect | REMARKS |
| Reputation | Untainted by allegations of wrong doing |
|
| Endorsement from the country's import and export partners |
| Strategy | Vote conversion based on AQUINO legacy and past alliances |
|
| Developing new TV ads targeting key economic sectors |
|
| Increasing ascendancy mileage from press releases |
|
| Increasing presence in voter psyche through TV news clips |
|
| Interviews in top-rated radio programs in the provinces |
|
| Meeting small business owners in provincial sorties |
| Platform | GMA policy continuity has advantages and benefits |
| Organization | Empowerment for provincial and district-level coordinators |
|
| Presenting the negatives on left-of-center presidency |
|
| Ensuring support from captains of industry nationwide |
|
| Winning command votes from business owners |
|
| Creating bandwagon in PNP/AFP balloting on April 24 |
|
| Consolidating initiatives in the services sector |
|
| External support from import, export chambers |
|
| Backstop by Muslim politicians in Mindanao |
| Staff | Recruitment, training and fielding more volunteers |
|
| Touching base with cabinet officials in GMA cabinet |
| Structure | Management of decentralized campaign strategy adjustments |
| Media Relations | Increasing media mileage through more press releases |
|
| Increasing opinion pitches to newspaper columnists |
| Corporate | Left-of-center scenarios to win confidence of CEOs |
| Specific actions | Rapid consolidation in vote-rich services sector |
|
| Raising ascendancy in the industrial sector |
|
| Quick consolidation in agriculture sector |
| THREATS ANALYSIS | |
| Specific Aspect | REMARKS |
| Personal Issues | Being a GMA surrogate |
|
| Turncoat from the Nationalist People's Coalition |
|
| Tied to GMA plan for speaker post in Congress |
|
| Breakdown in LAKAS-based provincial support |
| Financial | Unrealized campaign fund pledges |
| Negative Issues | Misuse of Defense Department assets for campaign |
|
| Soft stance on political warlords and private armies |
1Annotations and analysis from the Philippine NGO Coalition
2 As analyzed by the Philippine NGO Consortium for Rural Development
Analysis & Annotation By
The Campaigns & Image Group (Philippines)
4/5/2010
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